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Abstract 
 
Although a workfare scheme is potentially a cost-effective poverty alleviation 
scheme as it attracts only the poor who have an incentive to do unskilled manual 
works, an investigation of the ICRISAT data in India clarifies that the Employment 
Guarantee Scheme was mistargeted, i.e., a substantial share of the non-poor also   
participated.   The comparison of the EGS and universalism through the village-
level SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) model reveals that the former is neither 
efficient nor equitable than the latter unless the state government carefully designs 
the scheme so that the EGS assets, such as irrigation facilities, are made accessible 
to the poor without undermining their positive effects on agricultural productivity. 
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1. Introduction    
Targeting policy or targeted intervention is defined as the short-run intervention which 
concentrates limited resources to the poor in order to alleviate poverty.   It is generally thought 
that targeting is not only more cost-effective but also more equitable than is the universalism 
which transfers resources equally to all members in society.   However, it is not easy to 
empirically decide whether targeting is more efficient than universalism because targeting the 
poor involves substantial costs.     
Most studies on targeted intervention have focused manly on direct transfer benefits and few 
evaluated their indirect transfer effects and risk benefits, even though the impact of any anti-
poverty intervention is not limited to direct effects (Ravallion and Datt, 1995).  A point of 
departure of the present analysis is to shed an empirical light on the indirect effects of targeted 
interventions in comparison with the universalism.   As a case study, the impact of the 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (hereafter EGS) in the Indian State of Maharashtra is evaluated 
based on the ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics) 
Village Level Studies data.  Methodologically, the Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) are 
applied drawing upon Subramanian (1996) and Subramanian and Sadoulet (1990) to assess the 
indirect effects of the EGS.         
It is often argued that self-targeting scheme which leaves people to decide whether 
participate or not reduces the cost of targeting significantly and thus becomes one of the  cost-
effective alternatives (e.g. Besley and Kanbur, 1993;  Dreze and Sen, 1989 ; Sen, 1995).   
However, Gaiha (1996 a, b, 2000) reveals that the EGS, one of the well-known self-targeting 
schemes, was ‘mistargeted’ contrary to the conclusions of the former researches.  Our focus is to 
investigate how and why the EGS was mistargeted even though its self-targeting aspects are 
believed to improve targeting performance (Besley and Coate, 1992).    We will then try to 
clarify whether the self-targeting scheme can become the best alternative to targeting after taking 
account of its indirect effects.      
The next section reviews the arguments of the benefits and costs of targeting in comparison 
with those of universalism.   Sections 3 and 4 provide the salient features of the EGS and data 
sets.   Section 5 discusses how and why the EGS was mistargeted.   Section 6 compares the EGS 
with universalism by SAM models.   The last section offers some concluding remarks with 
policy implications. 
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2. Benefits and Costs of Targeting 
General Arguments 
Under budget constraints of the governments, directing the resources to the most needy leads 
to the most efficient policy, but this ‘first-best’ world is difficult to be achieved in the real world 
due to various costs of targeting and thus the necessity of considering the ‘second-best’ world 
arises (Besley and Kanbur,1993).   While targeting is always perfect and thus better than 
universalism in helping the poor in the first-best world, the former is not always better than the 
latter in the second-best world because of the existence of targeting costs.    
      Then we should ask; what kind of costs may arise in the second-best world?   Firstly, it is 
generally assumed that the administrative costs of identifying the poor are higher in finer 
targeting, i.e. the trade-off between the administrative costs of targeting and targeting outcomes 
exists.  However, the empirical study of Latin America by Grosh (1995) reveals that the 
administrative costs of programmes with good incidence need not be high and that there appears 
to be only a weak correlation between administrative costs and targeting outcomes.  On the other 
hand, universalism itself cannot be exempted from the administrative costs, such as counting and 
registering the number of households and the population.  Therefore, administrative costs are not 
necessarily the principal factors which make the fine targeting less cost-effective than 
universalism.   Secondly, we need to take into account the costs specific to targeted schemes.   
Targeting often affects the behaviour of both the poor as well as the non-poor.   The scheme 
which targets only the poor not just causes the problem of moral hazard but also might damage 
their self-respect (Sen, 1995).   On the other hand, under the targeting scheme, the non-poor tend 
to pretend to be poor by providing inaccurate information that they are poor (ibid., p.12).   It is 
obvious that these problems of the behavioral changes do not exist (or are less serious if they 
exist) in the universalistic scheme. 
In order to reduce these costs, some alternative ways of targeting have been proposed.  They 
include ‘the targeting using indicators’ and ‘self-targeting’ (Besley and Kanbur, 1993, Dreze and 
Sen, 1989).   The former is the targeting based on key indictors, such as specific region, gender, 
age, land-holding and so on.2   If the leakage of the poor and the excess coverage of the non-poor 
are not so large, the accurate targeting will be possible with minimum costs and the scheme will 
be more cost-effective than universalism.  
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Self-Targeting 
The latter (self-targeting) can be defined as ‘schemes based on self regulatory tests that only 
the truly poor would pass’ (Besley and Kanbur, 1993, p.78).   While the beneficiaries are 
specified by the governments in the ordinary targeted interventions, whether to participate or not 
is decided by the beneficiaries themselves in self-targeting scheme.   As a result, in the latter, all 
policy makers have to do is to set out the outline of the programme and set the selection criteria 
for the would-be beneficiaries.   Hence the targeting costs, such as administrative costs of 
targeting, the incentive distortion, and the disutility and stigma are theoretically zero, although 
the administrative costs other than targeting may arise.   That is why the self-targeting 
mechanism is often regarded as one of the best ways of targeting.   Then the next question arises: 
among various ways of targeting, is the self-selection scheme such as public employment scheme 
empirically the most efficient? 
     A well-known example of self-targeting is a workfare scheme in which participants obtain 
income or food in exchange for labour and they can decide whether to participate in it by 
themselves.   Another example of targeting is ‘transfers in kind’, the system in which the goods 
and services (e.g. education and medical treatment) are provided by states at various quality, so 
as to be demanded discretely (ibid. pp.80-81).   Some goods, such as cheep grain, are sometimes 
provided freely by governments for everyone in principle, but they are demanded only by the 
poor because they are bad in quality.   Hence this scheme is universalism de jure, but targeting 
de facto.   Both are important, but in the present study, we highlight the former (workfare) in 
order to clarify whether the self-targeting or universalism is better in reducing the poor.3 
 
3. The Features of the EGS  
The Employment Guarantee Scheme in Maharashtra was first experimentally initiated by Mr. 
V.C. Page in 1965.   It was subsequently expanded as part of an integrated rural development 
project, culminating in the EGS Act (No.XX of 1978) and its implementation in Maharashtra in 
1979.   From a modest beginning, the EGS expanded rapidly into the most important poverty-
alleviation programme in Maharashtra (Gaiha, 2000).  
                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Bigman and Srinivasan (2002) for the evidence and discussions of geographical targeting in rural India.  
3 See also Barrett and Clay (2003) who show that food-for-work schemes in Ethiopia resulted in targeting 
errors (or mistargeting) due to mismanagement of key operational details, such as the project’s wage rate.  
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     The EGS has the following features.   Firstly, the scheme guarantees that every adult who 
wants a job in rural areas will be given one, provided that he or she is willing to do unskilled 
manual work on a piece-rate basis.   In this sense, the decision as to whether to participate is left 
to the participants.    Secondly, until 1988, the wage rate was usually below the agricultural wage 
rate.   Thirdly, as the guarantee holds at district level, a person may be required to travel a long 
distance for a few days of temporary work.   
     The scheme must satisfy two criteria: being labour-intensive and creating productive assets 
(Dev, 1995).   As the EGS is aimed at minimising the recurrence of droughts by prioritising 
moisture or water conservation, it may indirectly reduce the possible risk for farming households.   
Work under the EGS should be so organised that it does not interfere with normal agricultural 
activities (Gaiha, 2000).  
 
4. The Data  
The ICRISAT data set covers information on farm production, consumption, wealth, 
household endowments, labour supply of household members, credit, and market transactions in 
ten villages in rural India for up to ten years, from the crop year 1975/76 to 1984/85.   Most of 
the data were collected again in 1989/90.   Forty households were chosen and surveyed in each 
village.   These forty households were equally stratified into four groups by the landholding class, 
namely 1) landless households, 2) small-scale farmers, 3) medium-scale farmers, and 4) large-
scale farmers.     
This study will use the data of two villages where the EGS operated: Shirapur (Sholapur 
District), and Kanzara (Akola District, Maharashtra).   The income level of these two villages is 
lower than the national standard in India.   Median income of Kanzara was higher than that of 
Shirapur as rainfall was more assured in the former (Walker and Ryan, 1990).   Average rainfall 
is 690mm, and 820mm in Shirapur and Kanzara respectively (Singh, Binswanger, and Jodha, 
1985).   In Kanzara, only four percent of the gross cropped area is irrigated, reflecting the 
assured rainfall.   The major production in Kanzara consists of rainy-season cotton and sorghum.   
The share of irrigated land in the gross cropped area is 14 percent in Shirapur.   Sorghum is the 
most important crop in Shirapur.   The form of credit also differs in two villages.   While formal 
loans play an important part in Kanzara, the informal credit is dominant in Shirapur (Walker and 
Ryan, 1990).    
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5. How and Why was the EGS Mistargeted?  
The EGS in Maharashtra has been regarded as a success of self-targeting (or self selection) 
mechanism in which a high work requirement results in a good targeting performance.  However, 
Gaiha (1996a,b, 2000) concludes that the EGS was ‘mistargeted’ and the targeting performance 
worsened over the years by comparing the ICRISAT VLS in 1979 and that in 1989 contrary to 
the conclusions of the former researches4 5.  This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the 
share of the poor (and the landless) among the EGS participants corresponds to their share in 
labour force and it decreased over the years. 
     Although Gaiha (1996a) compares the share of the poor in the EGS participants and that in 
the total population (1979; 48%: 54%, 1989; 27%: 29%), whether the excess coverage (E-
mistake) or the leakage of covering (F mistake) is more serious remains unclear.6   The 
disaggregation into E-mistakes and F-mistakes reveals that the large and increasing F-mistake is 
a main reason of mistargeting and its worsening (Table 1).   The more important feature is that 
most of the poor are not covered by the EGS and ‘leakage’ expanded over the years, rather than 
the existence of the ‘excess coverage.’ 7   Although the scheme is not aiming to cover all of the 
poor, the large and increasing F-mistake implies that the EGS has not worked as ‘targeting’ 
scheme, although its self-selection mechanism has been believed to enhance the targeting 
performance.        
 
(Table 1 to be inserted) 
 
                                                 
4 This conclusion is based on a particular poverty threshold (Rs. 180) and a specific poverty index (the head-
count ratio) in the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class.   Gaiha (2000) concludes by second and third 
stochastic dominance tests that the targeting of the EGS in terms of poverty gap index was better in 1989 at 
lower income levels and worse over the range Rs. 150-225 than in 1979, and that the targeting of the EGS in 
terms of squared poverty gap index was better in 1989 than in 1979.   However, he concludes that if the 
income class under Rs. 50 (in which the participants in 1989 are concentrated) is omitted there is a clear 
worsening of the EGS targeting for all FGT poverty indices over the range Rs. 75-225.      
5 It should be noted that the analysis of ‘mistargeting’ assumes that welfare can be accurately measured.   
Although the non-income dimension of welfare and the intra-household distribution should be considered, we 
will not deal with them for simplicity.   
6 Following Cornia and Stewart (1987, 1995), F-mistake is defined as the mistake of failure to reach the 
targeted population, and E-mistake means the excessive coverage of the non-poor occurring when the 
intervention reaches the non targeted population.     
7 The reason of the decrease in E mistakes from 1979 to 89 is a significant fall of the share of the EGS 
participant among the total population (17.7%⇒9.4%).   However, it should be noted that if the rates of growth 
of poor and non-poor populations are different, the comparison of E and F mistakes over time is problematic.      
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Then why the EGS was mistargeted even though its self-targeting aspect theoretically 
enhances the targeting performance?   Gaiha (1996b) attributes it mainly to the design and 
implementation of the scheme, i.e. to the political factors,8 most of which can be attributed to 
organizational inflexibility and bureaucratism in the EGS pointed out by Terhal (1995).  Gaiha 
also suggests the possibility that the poor without political support are excluded from the project.              
     Although the above analysis is comprehensive, some theoretical investigations will give us 
further insights.   Firstly, if Besley and Coate’s (1992, pp.253-255) ‘screening argument’ is 
applicable to ‘mistargeting’ of the EGS,  the work requirement will be below the optimal level at 
which ‘the screening mechanism’ works well so as to prevent the non-poor with higher 
opportunity costs of participation from participating the scheme.   That is, mistargeting implies 
that ‘the work requirement’ is not so high and thus the high-ability individuals have incentives to 
participate in the scheme.    Secondly, the aspect of piece-rate labour contracts of the EGS is 
worth investigating.   Since the agricultural labour market in Maharashtra consists mainly of the 
daily-rated labour (Walker and Ryan, 1990), Baland et. al.’s (1999) analysis of the coexistence 
of daily-wage and piece-rate contracts in agrarian economies may be appropriate for explaining 
the labour market in Maharashtra.   They show that daily-wage workers form a convex set in the 
space of working ability and that workers of high ability prefer piece-rate wage contracts because 
these allow them to take advantage of the opportunity to work fast (and earn high wages) instead 
of being forced to adopt the sluggish pace of daily wage workers and on the other hand workers 
with low ability prefer to work on piece-rate wage contracts because the pace of work on daily 
wage contracts is too demanding for them (and thus workers with medium ability prefer to work 
on daily wage contracts) (Baland et. al., 1999).   However, it should be noted that this model 
holds under a specific circumstance where every worker with a different level of ability can 
choose between piece-rate contracts and daily-wage contracts without any cost or constraint.                                
      The present analysis focuses on the labour market of the landless because most of the 
landless are wage workers.  While both Besley and Coate (1992) and Baland et. al. (1999) are 
based on the different income-generating abilities among the workers, there still remains an 
empirical question on how to measure abilities of workers.   Since the ICRISAT data do not have 
                                                 
8 Gaiha (1996b) argues that the employment rationing (due to the fact that the hike in EGS wages was not 
accompanied by a matching increase in the outlay) and the deficiencies of the design and implementation, such 
as the elaborate registration procedure, a long waiting time and the inappropriate choice of work site (very far 
in some cases) are main causes of mistargeting. 
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the direct data on worker’s ability, we assume that there is a correlation between the income-
generating ability and the average farm-wage per hour per worker over a fiscal year.   We then 
compare that average hourly farm-wage and its distribution of the EGS participants (those who 
are paid by piece-rate wage system) with those of the non-participants to indirectly examine the 
applicability of Besley and Coate (1992) and Baland et. al. (1999).            
Table 2 shows that the average hourly farm wages of the EGS-participants were higher than 
those of the EGS non-participants from 1979 to 1984 and 1989 in both male and female except 
the cases of female in 1983-84.   If the hourly average farm-wage expresses the income-
generating ability,9 it can be concluded that those who have high income-generating ability 
tended to participate in the EGS.10   This implies that the EGS was mistargeted over the years 
among the landless workers, that is, many of the landless workers whose hourly-farm wages 
were not high did not participate in the EGS.   Disaggregation by gender reveals that the wage 
differences between participants and non-participants were higher in male than in female except 
in 1979 and that hourly EGS wages of male were far higher than those of female, which implies 
that female workers whose income-generating abilities were assumed to be low did not do 
remunerative (but physically-demanding) works.   
 
(Table2 to be inserted) 
 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the average hourly farm wage of the EGS participants and 
the non-participants.   Based on the theory of piece-rate wage of Baland et. al.(1999), only the 
workers with high ability and low ability participate in the EGS and the workers with medium 
ability do not.   This pattern is observed clearly in 1979 and 1984 but it is less clear in the other 
years when the low-ability workers participated in the EGS.    However, it is safe to conclude 
that many of the high-ability workers (in top 20% rank of hourly farm wage) had a tendency to 
participate in the EGS.   That is, Table 3 implies, given the high correlation of hourly-farm wage 
and worker’s ability, that a significant portion of the landless workers with high ability tried to 
take advantage of the opportunity of working fast and hard in the EGS based on the piece-rate 
                                                 
9  This assumption is not so unrealistic because there was a high coefficient of correlation ( r =0.80) between 
the hourly EGS-wage, based on piece-rate contracts which reflect the individual abilities, and the hourly farm 
wage based on daily-wage contracts of each EGS participant over the years.    
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wage system and that many of the landless workers with low ability preferred to work less-
demanding works.             
 
(Table 3 to be inserted) 
 
Since the data related to the work requirement or the ability of the workers are not available, 
it is difficult to decide whether ‘the screening argument’ or ‘piece-rate wage theory’ is 
appropriate for explaining the mistargeting of the EGS.   If the former is applicable, the work 
requirement was too low to serve as the deterrent for the high-ability workers.  However, the 
further increase in the level of work requirement does not seem to improve targeting 
performance, because it was likely that the workers with low-ability included the elderly or those 
with low nutritious levels who could not satisfy higher work requirements.   With regard to the 
latter, it is safely concluded that the piece-rate wage system which attracts the workers with 
higher ability is one of the reasons of mistargeting.   Among landless workers, the majority of 
those with middle and low abilities could not have access to the EGS, partly because they tend to 
prefer the farm work based on the daily wage contracts to the EGS.   This observation 
corresponds to the argument of Gaiha (1996b) that the deficiencies of the design and 
implementation of the scheme deter the poor from participating in it.              
The small share of the EGS participants in the total adult landless implies mistargeting itself, 
since the large portion of the landless were poor and only 44% of the landless were covered by 
the EGS over the years.   With regard to the trend of mistargeting of the early 1980s, given a 
high correlation between the poor and the landless, we will note that the sharp improvement of 
targeting performance from1979 to1980 was followed by its gradual decline from 1981 to 1984 
and there was a further large drop in targeting rates in the late 1980s  (the share of EGS 
participants in the total adult landless:  1979; 30.6%, 1980; 63.8%, 1981; 55.3%, 1982; 53.3%, 
1983; 40.5%, 1984; 40.9%, 1989; 15.8%).    
In sum, the large portion of the poor landless with relatively lower hourly farm wage could 
not participate in the EGS and the participants consisted mainly of the less-poorer landless with 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 The wage difference between EGS participants and non-participants reflect long-term nutritional advantage 
(see Deolalikar and Gaiha, 1996). 
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higher wage, not only because of the nature of the piece-wage system and but also because of the 
deficiencies of the design and the implementation of the scheme.11       
 
6.  Indirect Effects of the EGS 
     Indirect effects can be defined as any effects (other than direct effects) which arise through 1) 
the creation of assets or infrastructure by the scheme,   2) the changes of market prices or wages 
(through market mechanism or the change of bargaining power between wage-workers and large 
farmers), or 3) the additional demand created by a Keynesian-type demand-driven system.12   All 
of these are usually observed some time (e.g. several months, or years) after the scheme operated 
and are called ‘second-round effects’ and the last two are so-called multiplier effects.   While the 
direct transfer effects occur immediately after the scheme operated and easy to identify, the 
indirect transfer effects continue for long time and difficult to be distinguished from the effects 
caused by other factors.   However, it is clear that the indirect effects should also be considered 
in the evaluation of any policy, hence the present analysis focuses on such a long-term effect of 
the EGS. 
      The past studies point to substantial indirect effects of the EGS.   With regard to the indirect 
effects arising through the assets, through the investigation of about 36 per cent of the total area 
of the eight blocks, Planning Commission reports that sizable gains in output through the assets 
were created by the EGS (GOI, 1980, cited by Ravallion, 1991, p.163).  Clearly, this effect is 
characteristic of the EGS whose primary objective is to improve the productivity of agricultural 
and other rural resources by constructing the assets such as wells and roads (Hirway and Terhal, 
1994).   This cannot arise through universal transfer.   However, there are restricting factors in 
this effect in the context of the EGS.   Firstly, since the scheme uses unskilled worker and its 
costs consist of 60 % for wages and 40 % for the rest, ‘the productivity is bound to be limited 
even when the best management methods are employed and the most fruitful projects such as 
irrigation, land development and soil conservation, afforestation, are properly implemented’ 
(Dandekar, 1983, p.66).   In addition, without appropriate project selection and supervision in the 
EGS, long delays will occur in completion of the work (Hirway and Terhal, 1994, pp.111-112) 
                                                 
11 It does not necessarily imply that the piece-rate contracts aggravate poverty because as the ability of the 
worker increases, the amount of the work under this contracts will also increase and thus may lead to the more 
efficient outcome in total (see Baland et. al. ,1999).   
12 The former two follow Ravallion (1991, p.162).  The third is based on Saith (1992, p.65).  
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and thus the long-term rate of return of the project will become considerably lowered.   
Secondly, the distribution of the benefits brought by the EGS assets was often disproportionate, 
i.e., they were in favour of the medium and large farmers who were not poor (ibid., p.112, 
Dandekar and Sathe, 1980, pp.710-711).   In order for the marginal and small farmers to have 
access to the EGS assets, institutional arrangements are crucial for them to be able to participate 
in local-decision making (Hirway and Terhal, 1994, p.113). 
       Using the ICRISAT VLS data, Gaiha (1997) shows that the EGS has a substantial effect on 
agricultural wages especially in the long run because the bargaining position of the rural workers 
toward the large landholders was strengthened due to the existence of the option of the 
employment in the EGS.   The study concludes that a sharp reduction in the share of poor 
participation was compensated by higher agricultural wage.   A similar conclusion to support for 
the substantial multiplier effect is drawn by Ravallion (1990) who assumes the urban/rural 
dualistic economy with mobility between a rural sector where wage is flexible and an urban 
sector where wage is fixed.  However, drawing upon 1987-89 data, Ravallion et. al. (1993) 
conclude that only 10 % increase in the EGS wage was passed on the agricultural wage rate and 
that second-round effects were not large.13   There still remains an empirical question over the 
magnitude of the scheme’s multiplier effects.                                          
 
SAM analysis on the EGS 
     Among various approaches which can evaluate the indirect effects and the linkages within the 
village14, the present analysis focuses on village-level Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) model 
which captures the linkages among the activities within a village and those between a village and 
the outside world (Taylor and Adelman, 1996)15.   Since the ICRISAT data exclude all the 
households whose primary and secondary income is not agricultural and thus do not cover all the 
necessary information for constructing a SAM, the following analysis is basically based on the 
former studies (Subramanian and Sadoulet, 1990 and Subramanian, 1996) in which a SAM of 
                                                 
13 However, the conclusion in Ravallion et. al. (1993) is suspect because of their failure to test for Granger-
Sims causality between agricultural and EGS wages.  
14 For example, Gaude, et. al. (1984), and Gaude, et. al. (1987) focus on the rate of return of the project.   From 
the various data about each project (total expenditures, cost price of works, direct and long-run employment 
etc.), they calculate the rate of return in the long run taking into account the indirect costs.    
15 The construction of a village SAM requires a number of simplifying assumptions, such as absence of prices, 
perfectly elastic supply, and linear, fixed proportion technologies (Taylor and Adelman, pp.25-26).  Hence our 
result is not exempted from the limitations associated with these assumptions.               
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Kanzara, one of the villages of Maharashtra, in 1984 was constructed to analyze the village 
structure.16   These studies use the ICRISAT Village Level Studies (VLS) and the data on non-
agricultural activities which were collected by Subramanian (1988).   The methodology used in 
this paper is to change the exogenous variables of their SAM by using the additional data of 
ICRISAT VLS and to compare the results.  
     Table 4 is the schematic SAM which shows the structure of their analysis.   The initial 
aggregate SAM used for the present analysis is shown in the appendix.   The each column 
indicates the expenditure account and corresponds to the each raw account (i.e. the revenue 
account), and the column total (the total expenditures) is equal to the raw total (the total 
revenues).   This matrix simplifies the structure of the village economy which is characterised by 
various activities, factors, and the institutions.   Following Subramanian and Sadoulet (1990), the 
rest of India, Government Services, and agriculture are regarded as exogenous in the model.   
The following experiments are carried out by changing the levels of exogenous accounts.  In 
particular, the wages of the EGS correspond to ‘factor earnings from outside’, and the transfer by 
the government corresponds to ‘transfer from outside’ in Table 4. 
      
(Table 4 to be inserted) 
 
Table 5 shows the results of various experiments as to the counter-factual of the EGS by 
using a SAM model.  Experiment 1 shows the case without the EGS assuming that the forgone 
income is zero.  In this case the landless and small household classes which include more 
participants of the EGS lose more than do the medium and large farmers.   The accounts of 
outputs, savings, and rest of India are also reduced significantly through the multiplier effects.   
Experiments 2 and 3 show the cases where the loss of the EGS in experiment 1 is supplemented 
by household-based universal transfer and individual-based universal transfer (of the same 
budget of the EGS)17 respectively.   In these cases, total household income and total output 
remain almost same.  The households which consist of  ‘large farmers’ gain more income in case 
                                                 
16An important feature of the SAM constructed by Subramanian is to solve, by making the agricultural sector 
exogenous, one of the limitations of SAM model, the assumption that the economy is demand constrained 
(Subramanian and Sadoulet, 1990, pp.148-149).  
17 For simplicity, it is assumed in these experiments that the wage-costs of the EGS are equal to the transfer of 
the universal scheme, that is, the non-wage costs of the former are equal to the costs other than the transfer of 
the latter.   
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of universal transfer, and individual-based universal transfer brings a more regressive result 
because there are more average members in the larger households than in the smaller households. 
 
(Table 5 to be inserted) 
 
     But the assumption that the foregone income is zero is not realistic, because without the EGS 
the participants would try to use part of their time in other income-generating activities.   The 
necessity then arises to take an explicit account of the forgone income.   Datt and Ravallion 
(1994) and Ravallion and Datt (1995) use the conditional time allocation model (CTAM) which 
considers ‘the intra-household allocation of time conditional on existing public-works 
employment’ (Datt and Ravallion, 1994, p.1347, emphasis in the original) based on ICRISAT 
VLS in order to analyze the net direct transfer effects of the EGS.   Using their analysis as to 
average forgone incomes of the EGS (Ravallion and Datt, 1995, p.424), we take into 
consideration the forgone income in the experiments 4, 5, and 6.18   Once we take into account 
the foregone income of the participants (in the experiment 4), the decrease in total household 
income and in output is reduced by 40 % (compared with the experiment 1).   If we add the 
universal transfer of same budget of the EGS and the forgone income (in the experiment 5 and 
6), the total household income will increase by 1 % and the total output will go up by 0.46-0.47 
%.  Since the experiments 5 and 6 can be regarded as the relevant counter-factual of the EGS in 
that the forgone income is considered, it can be concluded that the universal transfer is more 
efficient than the EGS, even if the multiplier effects are taken into account.19  This is mainly 
because the forgone income of the EGS is substantial.   If we compare the initial state (with the 
EGS) with the cases with universal transfer (experiments 5 and 6) in terms of equity, the result of 
household-based transfer scheme (experiment 5) is the most equitable, that of the individual-
based universal transfer (experiment 6) comes next, and the initial state is the worst.  This result 
that ‘universalism is more equitable than targeting’ seems to be contradictory at first sight.   
However, it not only corresponds to the conclusion of Gaiha (1996a, b, 2000) that the EGS was 
                                                 
18 We assume that the time allocation of 1984 in Kanzara is as same as that of six years (1979-1984) in 
Kanzara which is calculated by Ravallion and Datt (1995, p.424).   According to them, among all activities 
(84.39 days) corresponding to ‘public works’, 32.96 days should have been spent on wage labour.      
19 This conclusion (universalism is better than targeting) corresponds to that of Ravallion and Datt (1995) who 
uses the counter-factual approach to analyse the direct transfer effects.  
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mistargeted, but also shows that his conclusion still holds even if multiplier effects are taken into 
account.       
These results must be treated with caution because only a part of the indirect effects, the 
multiplier effects are considered in the SAM analysis.   More important could be the indirect 
effects through the EGS assets.   Due to the limitation of the data, we follow the methodology of 
Subramanian and Sadoulet (1990) who investigate the effects of investment in irrigation by 
regarding it as the transfer from the dry lands into the wet lands.   We assume here that the two-
thirds of the non-wage costs (i.e. about 22 % of the total costs of the EGS, if one-thirds of the 
total costs are the non-wage costs as assumed in Ravallion and Datt (1995)) are spent in the costs 
of constructing wells and electric pump sets  and ‘the benefits of irrigation are---measured by the 
difference in value added (VA) per acre between irrigated and dry land, which in 1984 was Rs 
579 for large farmers’ and ‘this increase was assumed to apply to all farms’ (Subramanian and 
Sadoulet,1990, p.157)20.   The effect of the EGS asset is shown in the experiment 7 in Table 5.   
The increase in both total household income and outputs is substantial, given that the effect of 
irrigation is observed in the same year.   The implication of this experiment is twofold.   Firstly, 
comparison of the experiment 5/6 and the experiment 7 suggests that universalism is slightly 
more efficient than the EGS with the indirect effects created by assets.   However, the indirect 
effects arising through assets, such as irrigation, remain for a long time (if depreciation is 
ignored), and thus these effects are accumulated as long as the EGS continues every year.   On 
the other hand, the effects of universal transfer are limited within a year.   Hence, experiment 7 
implies that the effects of continuation of the EGS for a couple of years may exceed those of the 
universalism.   Secondly, the benefits of irrigation concentrate on the large farmers, since they 
can appropriate most of the multiplier effects arising in the process of shifting from dry 
agriculture to wet agriculture.   This result corresponds to the claim that ‘in Maharashtra a 
disproportionate share of---extra benefits (created by the EGS assets) has gone to the rural rich 
and this has been an important factor in achieving political support for the EGS’(World Bank, 
                                                 
20 In our case, the multiplier effects are assumed to be distributionally neutral.  
20 We assume that in this experiment, for simplicity, all the EGS assets are irrigation, but it overestimates their 
effects because the productivity of irrigation is relatively higher than the other EGS assets.  It should be noted 
that in 1984-85, only 32.3% of the total expenditure of the EGS is spent on irrigation (Hirway and Terhal, 
1994, p.113).    
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1990, p.98).   The experiment 7 implies that an indirect effect created by assets is substantial and 
that careful design and implementation are necessary in order for the poor or the landless to 
enjoy the benefits of the EGS assets.   This conclusion is similar to the results of Narayana, et. al 
(1988) which show based on CGE model that rural works programs in India can become an 
effective instrument for virtually alleviating poverty through the long-term indirect effects, 
including the effects created by roads or irrigation, if they are well planned and executed.                                      
 
7. Concluding Observations and Policy Implication 
In the debates around poverty alleviation policies in developing countries which face the 
necessity both of reducing the poor and of limiting the public spending,  ‘targeting’ is regarded 
as an attractive way of intervention.   However, substantial costs, such as administrative costs are 
necessary for ‘targeting the poor’ accurately.   That is why the theoretical literature has focused 
on the advantage of self-targeting schemes, such as workfare scheme, which are shown to have 
relatively small targeting costs (e.g. Besley and Kanbur, 1993; Sen, 1995).    
The Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in Maharashtra has long been believed to be a 
success of the self-targeting scheme through workfare leading to a good targeting performance.  
However, as Gaiha (1996a, b, 2000) points out, the EGS was ‘mistargeted’ and the targeting 
performance became worsened over the years.  The disaggregation of the landless reveals that 
the poorer in this subgroup with low income-generating ability (with low hourly farm-wage) are 
excluded from the EGS due to the political factors, such as failure of the design and 
implementation, and the economic factors, that is, the piece-rate wage system of the scheme.   
     Apart from the price effects (e.g. the increasing agricultural wage of the EGS through the 
improved position of the small farmers or landless workers toward the large landholders), even if 
the multiplier effects of the EGS are taken into account by the SAM model, it can be concluded 
that universal transfer of the same budget of the EGS is more efficient in alleviating poverty than 
the EGS.   It corresponds to Ravallion and Datt (1995) who conclude through an investigation of 
direct transfer effects of the EGS, that universal transfer of its same budget had a greater impact 
on poverty incidence.   However, the continuing indirect effects created by the EGS assets might 
have a potential which makes the EGS more efficient than the universal transfer as Ravallion and 
Datt (1995) predict.  On the other hand, our result also has a caveat that the EGS will become far 
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less cost-effective than universalism without efforts of policy-makers to select the projects 
yielding high productivity and maintain the infrastructures in good conditions.       
     Another caveat is related to the issue of equity.   The preceding analysis not only shows 
‘mistargeting’ of the EGS where the poorer of the landless are excluded.   Also implied is the 
possibility that the indirect effects created by the EGS assets are appropriated mainly by large 
farmers.   A major solution is to change the design of the EGS to enable the poor to participate in 
the scheme and to access the EGS assets, such as irrigation facilities.   Furthermore, since the 
preceding analysis points to a limitation of self-targeting schemes, supplementary policies, for 
example, targeting the landless or households which do not include the would-be (or high-
income) participants (e.g. the elderly), should be combined with the EGS.                      
     Further implication of the preceding analysis is related to the methodologies of evaluation of 
poverty alleviation policies.   While the effects of any anti-poverty policy are not confined to 
direct effects but include indirect effects, most of the past studies focus only on the former.   
Hence, the village-level SAM or CGE model should be encouraged to construct to analyze the 
indirect effects of the policy based on the improved household data now available in many 
developing countries.   
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Table 1 Mistargeting of the EGS 
 
       1979       1989 
E-mistake *1, *2       20.0%           9.7% 
F-mistake *1, *3       84.2%         91.1% 
The Share of the poor in  
the participants in the EGS *1 
    
      48.2% 
    
       27.3% 
The Share of the poor in  
the total population  *1  
    
      54.0% 
    
       29.0% 
    Source: ICRISAT VLS data and Gaiha (1996 a).  
Notes  *1   Poverty Threshold is set to be per capita income of 180Rs.  
           *2   (E-mistake) = {(The number of the non-poor EGS participants) / (The total number of 
                                            the non-poor)}*100 
            *3    (F-mistake) =  {(The number of the poor  not covered by the EGS) / (The total number 
                                            of  the poor)}*100 
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Table 2  Average Hourly Farm Nominal Wage* of the EGS participants and the Non- participants   
(and the Average Hourly EGS Nominal Wage of the participants) of landless adult workers  in 
Shirapur and Kanzara  (Rs.)        
 M a l e F e m a l e                T o t a l 
 Hourly 
EGS  
Wage 
           (M) 
 
 
 /(M-F)/F   
   * 100(%) 
Hourly 
Farm 
Wage of 
EGS 
Partici- 
pants  (A) 
 /(A-B)/B   
   * 100(%) 
Hourly 
Farm 
Wage of 
Non par- 
ticipants 
         (B) 
   
Hourly 
EGS  
Wage 
      (F) 
Hourly 
Farm 
Wage of 
EGS 
Partici- 
pants  (A) 
 /(A-B)/B   
   * 100(%)
 
Hourly 
Farm 
Wage of 
Non par- 
ticipants 
         (B) 
   
Hourly 
EGS  
Wage 
Hourly 
Farm 
Wage of 
EGS 
Partici- 
pants  (A) 
 /(A-B)/B   
   * 100(%) 
 
Hourly 
Farm 
Wage of 
Non par- 
ticipants 
         (B) 
   
1979 0.71 
(69.0%) 
0.72 
(24.1%) 
0.58 0.42 0.43 
(43.3%) 
0.30 0.62 0.63 
(61.5%) 
0.39 
1980 0.69 
(72.5%) 
0.72 
(24.1%) 
0.58 0.40 0.37 
(15.6%) 
0.32 0.56 0.57 
(39.0%) 
0.41 
1981 0.83 
(76.6%) 
0.81 
(11.0%) 
0.73 0.47 0.55 
(7.8%) 
0.51 0.68 0.70 
(12.9%) 
0.62 
1982 1.06 
(82.8%) 
1.05 
(19.3%) 
0.88 0.58 0.55 
(7.8%) 
0.51 0.84 0.82 
(22.4%) 
0.67 
1983 1.09 
(55.7%) 
1.00 
(3.1%) 
0.97 0.70 0.55 
(0%) 
0.55 0.95 0.84 
(13.5%) 
0.74 
 
1984 
 
1.37 
(80.3%) 
1.03 
(3.0%) 
1.00 0.76 0.47 
(-20.3%) 
0.59 1.10 0.78 
(2.6%) 
0.76 
1989 2.01 
(42.6%) 
2.27 
(41.0%) 
1.61 1.41 1.43 
(25.4%) 
1.14 1.81 1.99 
(49.6%) 
1.33 
       Source:   Calculated from the ICRISAT VLS data.  
       *The adults who did not participate in the agricultural labour markets (i.e. whose average farm  
         hourly income is zero) are not included.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22
Table 3  The Distribution of the Average Hourly-Farm Nominal Wage* of the EGS participants 
and the Non- participants of  landless adult workers in Shirapur and Kanzara             
 1979 1980 1981 1982 
The rank of  
Hourly-Farm 
Wage           
EGS 
Partici 
-pants 
Non- 
Partici 
-pants 
EGS 
Partici 
-pants 
Non- 
Partici 
-pants 
EGS 
Partici 
-pants 
Non- 
Partici 
-pants 
EGS 
Partici 
-pants 
Non- 
Partici 
-pants 
     80-100% 54.5% 4.8% 31.3% 0% 19.2% 21.0% 25.0% 14.3%
       60-80% 27.3% 16.8% 18.0% 23.5% 22.3% 17.1% 20.8% 19.0%
       40-60% 9.1% 24.8% 24.7% 11.8% 28.5% 9.5% 25.0% 14.3%
       20-40% 7.3% 25.6% 9.3% 38.8%     14.6% 26.7%     12.5% 28.6%
        0-20% 28.0% 5.0% 16.7% 25.9% 15.4% 25.7% 16.7% 23.8%
         Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Share of Total Adult 
Landless 
 
30.6% 
 
69.4% 63.8% 36.2% 55.3%
 
44.7% 
 
53.3% 46.7%
 1983 1984 1989 Total 
The rank of  
Hourly-Farm 
Wage           
EGS 
Partici 
-pants 
Non- 
Partici 
-pants 
EGS 
Partici 
-pants 
Non- 
Partici 
-pants 
EGS 
Partici 
-pants 
Non- 
Partici 
-pants 
EGS 
Partici 
-pants 
Non- 
Partici 
-pants 
      80-100% 35.3% 9.6% 26.7% 15.4% 66.7% 11.3% 31.2% 11.1%
       60-80% 10.6% 26.4% 23.3% 17.7%     16.7% 20.6% 19.8% 20.1%
       40-60% 24.7% 16.8% 11.1% 26.2% 0% 23.8% 21.2% 19.0%
       20-40%     11.8% 25.6% 12.2% 25.4%          0% 23.8%     11.1% 27.1%
         0-20% 17.6% 21.6% 26.7% 15.4% 16.7% 20.6% 16.7% 22.6%
         Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Share of Total Adult 
Landless 
 
40.5% 
 
59.5% 40.9% 59.1% 15.8%
 
84.2% 
 
44.1% 55.9%
            Source:   Calculated from the ICRISAT VLS data.  
          *The adults who do not participate in the agricultural labour markets are not included.       
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Table 4  Schematic of the Social Accounting Matrix        
 Endogenous 
Activi- 
ties 
Except 
Agri- 
culture 
 
Commo
d- 
 ities 
 
Factors 
 
 
Institu- 
tions 
 
 
Capital 
 
 
Mainte- 
nance 
 
 
Stocks 
 
Exogenous 
Rest of 
India 
 
 
Gove
rn-
ment
servi
ces 
 
Activity 
Agri- 
culture 
Endogenous 
Activities 
Except 
Agriculture 
 
--- 
 
Commod
- 
ity 
supplies 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Commodi- 
ties 
Interme- 
diate 
Demands 
Composit
e 
Commod
- 
ities 
 
--- 
Consump-
tion 
expendi-
tures 
Invest- 
ment 
Demand 
Mainte- 
nance 
Expend-
itures 
Stock 
changes
 
Exports  
--- 
Interme- 
diate 
Demands 
Factors 
 
Wages, 
interest 
salaries, 
rents 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Interest 
paid on 
consump-
tion 
loans 
Payments 
to  
labor for 
investment
Payments 
to  
labor for 
mainte-
nance 
 
--- 
Factor 
earnings 
from 
outside 
(*1) 
 
--- 
Wages, 
 salaries 
Institutions 
 
Profits to 
households 
 Factor 
  pay- 
ments     
 to 
House- 
holds 
Transfer 
between 
House- 
holds 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Transfer 
from 
outside 
(*2) 
 
--- 
Profits to 
households
Capital ---        --- --- Savings --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Stocks 
 
 
--- 
Commod
- 
ity 
supplies 
from 
stocks 
 
--- 
Change in
Private 
Stocks 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Maintenance 
 
Mainte- 
nance 
expences 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Mainte- 
nance of 
consumer 
durable 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Mainte- 
nance 
expenses 
Exogenous 
Rest of India 
 
 
Taxes to 
rest of India 
 
Imports 
 
Factor 
pay 
-ments 
outside 
 
Transfer to
rest of  
India 
 
Capital 
outflows 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Taxes to 
rest of 
India 
   Government  
     Services 
 
 
--- 
Commod
- 
ity 
supplies 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Activity 
Agriculture 
 
--- 
Commod
- 
ity 
supplies 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
Source:  Based on Subramanian and Sadoulet (1990, p.136). 
(*1)       The wage of the EGS can be adjusted through the factor earnings from outside.  
(*2)     The universal transfer can be adjusted through the transfer from outside. 
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Table 5 With-targeting and Without-targeting through public works (Counter-factual) Comparison  
and the effects of the assets created by the EGS, by applying a SAM to the economy of Kanzara, 
Maharashtra,1984  (%) 
  Experim ents  
          1       2       3       4 5 6 7 
  
 
 
 
    Level in  
    BaseYear  
 
            (Rs) 
Without
   EGS 
 + Zero- 
foregone  
income 
Without
   EGS 
 + With 
 House 
 -hold 
based 
universal 
transfer 
Without
   EGS 
 + With 
 Individ 
-ual based
universal 
transfer 
Without
   EGS 
 +With 
foregone  
income
Without 
   EGS 
 +With 
foregone  
income 
 +House 
 -hold 
based 
universal 
 transfer 
Without
   EGS 
 +With 
foregone  
income
 +Individ  
  -ual 
based 
universal 
 transfer 
   With 
   EGS 
 +With 
  Indirect 
  Effects 
  Caused 
 by  
  irriga 
   -tion  
 
Factor  Incomes:   
Hired Male 261,115 -16.39 -16.26 -16.26 -11.01 -10.88 -10.88 0.32
   Hired Female 132,701 -6.89 -6.98 -6.98 -2.26 -2.66 -2.26 0.87
     Farm Servants 121,260 -0.15 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.06 0.06 0.66
Household Income:   
Landless Salaried 80,943 -0.81 1.36 1.59 -0.46 1.68 1.91 0.01
Landless Unsalaried 288,268 -7.95 -1.51 -1.72 -4.79 1.65 1.44 0.47
    Small Farmers 218,963 -5.51 -0.24 -1.11 -3.26 2.01 1.14 0.59
Medium Farmers 431,524 -3.70 -0.97 -0.65 -2.32 0.41 0.73 -0.01
    Large Farmers 1,198,676 -0.46 0.66 0.74 -0.29 0.83 0.91 0.81
    Total Change in 
   Household income 
 -2.57 -0.00 -0.00 -1.57 1.00 1.00 0.55
Activity Outputs:   
         Dry Agriculture 1,248,141 -1.49 -0.07 -0.08 -0.91 0.51 0.50 0.33
         Wet Agriculture 511,497 -1.51 -0.06 -0.07 -0.92 0.53 0.52 0.34
  Live Stock 405,032 -0.69 0.01 0.01 -0.42 0.28 0.28 0.69
Agricultural services 40,791 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 1.06
Village production 61,840 -0.99 -0.05 -0.05 -0.60 0.33 0.34 0.29
          Trade 476,066 -1.40 -0.03 -0.03 -0.85 0.52 0.52 0.35
   Total Change in 
    Output 
 -1.33 -0.05 -0.05 -0.81 0.47 0.46 0.40
Total Savings 356,640 -0.91 0.58 0.67 -0.56 0.93 1.02 0.69
Rest of India 2,066,976 -1.18 0.06 0.07 -0.72 0.52 0.53 0.49
Source: Computed from SAM model based on Subramanian and Sadoulet(1990) and ICRISAT VLS data.
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Appendix 1. Social Accounting Matrix for Kanzara: Activity accounts (rupees)       [Activity Accounts]   
 Dry Agriculture   Wet   Agricyltural   Village  Retail Government   All 
  Small Medium Large Agriculture  Livestock Services Production  Trade services Activities 
Dry Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(small)            
Dry Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(Medium)            
Dry Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(Large)            
Wet Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Livestock 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agricultural Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Village Production 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Retail trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Government Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   All Activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Social Expenditures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cereals and pulses 1,018 2,563 6,257 5,933 7,926 0 0 64,685 0 88,382 
Other Foods 821 2,067 9,541 8,240 0 0 195 154,694 0 175,558 
Nonfood 960 2,417 7,762 10,068 153,911 1,665 3,654 185,222 15,000 380,659 
Agricultural Inputs 20,117 50,651 233,637 147,815 23,122 157 5,117 0 0 480,616 
Durables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17,120 0 17,120 
   All Commodities 22,916 57,698 257,197 172,056 184,959 1,822 8,966 421,721 15,000 1,142,335 
Family male 5,472 15,273 42,330 23,609 0 0 0 0 0 86,684 
Family female 6,737 15,082 12,798 2,047 0 0 0 0 0 36,664 
Hired Male 3,162 6,465 30,390 19,849 0 2,070 1,094 2,080 0 65,110 
Hired Female 3,393 10,424 56,480 34,540 0 0 0 0 0 104,837 
Farm servants 0 0 18,011 14,397 26,315 0 0 0 0 58,723 
Salaried workers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32,400 32,400 
Rent* 6,030 15,182 61,805 1,857 0 0 0 0 0 84,874 
Private credit 2,118 5,332 520 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,970 
Public credit 3,245 8,171 21,186 16,315 15,188 600 200 400 0 65,305 
   All factors 30,157 75,929 243,520 112,614 41,503 2,670 1,294 2,480 32,400 542,567 
Landless Salaried 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Landless Unsalaried 8,615 0 0 -111 4,159 0 15,830 3,860 0 32,353 
Small Farms 32,422 0 0 10,603 7,463 19,970 1,300 0 0 71,758 
Medium farmers 0 103,323 0 -572 10,376 0 8,376 21,158 0 142,661 
Large Farmers 0 0 403,879 212,506 156,572 15,349 24,074 26,847 0 839,227 
  All households 41,037 103,323 403,879 222,426 178,570 35,319 49,580 51,865 0 1,085,999 
Temple 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Village government 8 20 563 412 0 0 0 0 0 1,003 
Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maintenance 468 1,179 4,121 2,458 0 980 1,000 0 0 10,206 
Stock Changes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rest of India 408 1,026 4,693 1,531 0 0 1,000 0 0 8,658 
    Total 94,994 239,175 913,973 511,497 405,032 40,791 61,840 476,066 47,400 2,790,768 
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 Appendix 1 (cont.) Social Accounting Matrix for Kanzara: Activity accounts (rupees)   
 Social Cereals & Other  Non- Agricultural    All 
  Expenditures Pulses Foods Foods Imputs Durables Commodities 
 0 37,491 4,287 53,215 0 0 94,993
         
 0 94,397 10,793 133,987 0 0 239,177
         
 0 325,669 106,205 482,098 0 0 913,972
         
 0 184,158 104,809 222,530 0 0 511,497
 0 0 210,823 0 194,210 0 405,033
 0 0 0 0 40,791 0 40,791
 0 0 0 59,550 2,290 0 61,840
 0 83,844 248,683 122,094 0 21,444 476,065
 0 0 0 47,400 0 0 47,400
  0 725,559 685,600 1,120,874 237,291 21,444 2,790,768
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 39,853 0 0 0 0 0 39,853
 10,510 0 0 0 0 0 10,510
 54,849 0 0 0 0 0 54,849
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  105,212 0 0 0 0 0 105,212
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 2,375 0 12,775 41,025 34,542 90,717
 0 376,309 269,192 584,176 223,249 279,347 1,732,273
  105,212 1,104,243 954,792 1,717,825 501,565 335,333 4,718,970 
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 Appendix 1 (cont.)  [Commodity & Factor Accounts]          
Family Family Hired Hired Farm Salaried   Private Public   All 
 Male Female Male Female Servant Workers Rent Credit Credit Factors 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
           
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
           
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
           
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 3,064 1,681 0 71,269 2,230 500 0 78,744
1,588 1,018 104,036 60,957 32,810 0 10,316 2,500 0 213,225
5,006 5,816 54,950 39,455 22,500 0 8,594 1,500 0 137,821
15,273 15,083 79,989 26,380 48,530 76,005 13,080 1,500 0 275,840
64,818 14,747 19,076 4,228 17,420 111,285 24,517 4,000 0 260,091
86,685 36,664 261,115 132,701 121,260 258,559 58,737 10,000 0 965,721
0 0 0 0 0 0 6,475 0 0 6,475
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 126 126 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 19,662 9,269 65,179 94,110
86,685 36,664 261,115 132,701 121,260 258,559 84,874 19,269 65,305 1,066,432
 
 28
 Appendix 1 (cont.)          
Landless Landless Farming Farming Farming   All 
Salaried Unsalaried  Small Medium Large Households 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,504 29,162 6,866 30,843 32,837 105,212 
22,192 129,703 94,724 176,197 257,631 680,447 
11,430 51,729 39,853 110,884 166,845 380,741 
12,303 62,088 38,440 107,658 179,581 400,070 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2,188 11,604 11,800 10,833 17,832 54,257 
53,617 284,286 191,683 436,415 654,726 1,620,727 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
526 2,789 2,031 530 5,423 11,299 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
526 2,789 2,031 530 5,423 11,299 
41 162 176 115 378 872 
305 9,895 6,507 5,794 6,730 29,231 
140 1,476 1,544 1,745 1,828 6,733 
116 4,003 3,403 1,904 3,597 13,023 
135 1,516 1,282 1,516 31,969 36,418 
737 17,052 12,912 11,074 44,502 86,277 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
49 256 652 175 601 1,733 
34,333 22,335 -6,633 4,327 295,726 350,088 
12 65 581 2,531 4,653 7,842 
-8,762 -40,795 9,818 -38,138 122,208 44,331 
431 2,281 7,919 14,610 70,835 96,076 
80,943 288,269 218,963 431,524 1,198,674 2,218,373 
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 Appendix 1 (cont.)   [Institution Accounts]         
   Village     Stock  Rest of  Total 
  Temple Government    Capital Maintenance   Change  India     
0 0 0 0 0 0  94,993 
         
0 0 0 0 0 0  239,177 
         
0 0 0 0 0 0  913,972 
         
0 0 0 0 0 0  511,497 
0 0 0 0 0 0  405,033 
0 0 0 0 0 0  40,791 
0 0 0 0 0 0  61,840 
0 0 0 0 0 0  476,065 
0 0 0 0 0 0  47,400 
0 0 0 0 0 0   2,790,768 
0 0 0 0 0 0  105,212 
0 0 0 0 84,191 211,371  1,104,244 
0 0 0 0 64,212 353,770  984,791 
4,955 445 0 640 4,434 871,773  1,717,825 
0 0 0 4,975 12,211 3,762  501,564 
0 0 203,001 10,282 0 50,674  335,334 
4,955 445 203,001 15,897 165,048 1,491,350   4,748,970 
0 0 0 0 0 0  86,684 
0 0 0 0 0 0  36,664 
720 2,037 17,779 2,151 0 173,319  261,116 
0 0 0 0 0 27,864  132,701 
0 0 0 0 0 62,537  121,260 
0 0 0 0 0 226,159  258,559 
0 0 0 0 0 0  84,874 
0 0 0 0 0 0  19,269 
0 0 0 0 0 0  65,305 
720 2,037 17,779 2,151 0 489,879   1,066,432 
0 0 0 0 0 1,327  80,943 
0 0 0 0 0 13,459  288,268 
0 0 0 0 0 2,651  218,963 
0 0 0 0 0 0  431,524 
0 0 0 0 0 62,939  1,198,675 
0 0 0 0 0 80,376   2,218,373 
0 0 0 0 0 0  6,475 
0 0 0 0 0 5,372  8,234 
800 5,752 0 0 0 0  356,640 
0 0 0 0 0 0  18,048 
0 0 0 0 0 0  135,048 
0 0 165,860 0 0 0  2,096,977 
6,475 8,234 386,640 18,048 165,048 2,066,977   13,445,965 
 
